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Abstract. As autonomy becomes prevalent in many applications, ranging from rec-
ommendation systems to fully autonomous vehicles, there is an increased need
to provide safety guarantees for such systems. The problem is difficult, as these
are large, complex systems which operate in uncertain environments, requiring
data-driven machine-learning components. However, learning techniques such as
Deep Neural Networks, widely used today, are inherently unpredictable and lack
the theoretical foundations to provide strong assurance guarantees. We present a
compositional approach for the scalable, formal verification of autonomous sys-
tems that contain Deep Neural Network components. The approach uses assume-
guarantee reasoning whereby contracts, encoding the input-output behavior of indi-
vidual components, allow the designer to model and incorporate the behavior of the
learning-enabled components working side-by-side with the other components. We
illustrate the approach on an example taken from the autonomous vehicles domain.
Keywords: model checking, compositional verification, assume-guarantee rea-
soning, autonomy, deep learning
1. Introduction
Autonomy is increasingly preva;ent in many applications, ranging from recommenda-
tion systems to fully autonomous vehicles, that require strong safety assurance guran-
tees. However, this is difficult to achieve, since autonomous sytems are large, complex
systems, that operate in uncertain environment conditions and often use data-driven,
machine-learning algorithms. Machine-learning techniques such as deep neural nets
(DNN), widely used today, are inherently unpredictable and lack the theoretical founda-
tions to provide the assurance guarantees needed by safety-critical applications. Current
assurance approaches involve design and testing procedures that are expensive and inad-
equate, as they have been developed mostly for human-in-the-loop systems and do not
apply to systems with advanced autonomy.
We propose a compositional approach for the scalable verification of learning-
enabled autonomous systems to achieve design-time assurance guarantees. The approach
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Figure 1. Overview
is illustrated in Figure 1. The input to the framework is the design model of an au-
tonomous system (this could be given as e.g. Simulink/Stateflow or prototype implem-
ntation). As the verification of the system as a whole is likely intractable we advocate
the use of compositional assume-guarantee verification whereby formally defined con-
tracts allow the designer to model and reason about learning-enabled components work-
ing side-by-side with the other components in the system. These contracts encode the
properties guaranteed by the component and the environment assumptions under which
these guarantees hold. The framework will then use compositional reasoning to decom-
pose the verification of large systems into the more manageable verification of individ-
ual components, which are formally checked against their respective assume-guarantee
contracts. The approach enables separate component verification with specialized tools
(e.g. one can use software model checking for a dicrete-time controller but hybrid model
checking for the plant component in an autonomous sytem) and seamless integration of
DNN analysis results.
For DNN analysis, we proposde to use clustering techniques to automatically dis-
cover safe regions where the networks behave in a predictable way. The evidence ob-
tained from this analysis is conditional, subject to constraints defined by the safe re-
gions, and is encoded in the assume-guarantee contracts. The contracts allow us to relate
the DNN behavior to the validity of the system-level requirements, using compositional
model checking. We illustrate the approach on an example of an autonomous vehicle that
uses DNN in the perception module.
2. Compositional Verification
Formal methods provide a rigorous way of obtaining strong assurance guarantees of
computing systems. There are several challenges to formally modeling and verifying au-
tonomous systems. Firstly, such systems comprise of many heterogeneous components;
each with different implementations and requirements, which can be addressed best with
different verification models and techniques. Secondly, the state space of such systems
is very large. Suppose we could model all the components of such a system as formally
specified (hybrid) models; even ignoring the learning aspect, their composition would
likely be intractable. The DNN components make the scalability problem even more se-
rious: for example the feature space of RGB 1000X600px pictures for an image classifier
used in the perception module of an autonomous vehicle contains 2561000X600X3 ele-
ments. Last but not the least, it is not clear how to formally reason about the DNN com-
ponents as there is no clear consensus in the research community on a formal definition
of correctness for the underlying machine learning algorithms.
We propose a compositional assume-guarantee verification approach for the scalable
verification of autonomous systems where DNN components are working side-by side
with the other components. Compositional verification frameworks have been proposed
before to improve the reliability and predictability of CPS [1,17,4,5], but none of these
works address systems that include DNN components. Recent work [6] proposes a com-
positional framework for the the analysis of autonomous systems with DNN components.
However, that approach addresses falsification in such systems and, while that is very
useful for debugging, it is not clear how it can be used to provide assurance guarantees.
Assume-guarantee reasoning attempts to break up the verification of a large system
into the local verification of individual components, using assumptions about the rest
of the system. The simplest assume-guarantee rule first checks that a component M1
satisfies a property P under an assumption A (this can be written as M1 |= A → P ). If
the “environment" M2 of M1 (i.e., the rest of the system in which M1 operates) satisfies
A (written as M2 |= true → P ), then we can prove that the whole system composed
of M1 and M2 satisfies P . Thus we can decompose the global property P into two
local assume-guarantee properties (i.e., contracts) A → P and A that are expected to
hold on M1 and M2 respectively. Other, more involved, rules allow reasoning about the
circular dependencies between components, where the assumption for one component
is used as the guarantee of the other component and vice versa; if the conjunction of
the assumptions implies the specification than the overall system guarantees the system-
level requirement. Rules that involve circular reasoning use inductive arguments, over
time, formulas to be checked, or both, to ensure soundness. Furthermore, the rules can
be naturally generalized to reasoning about more than two components and use different
notions for property satisfaction such as trace inclusion or refinement checking.
The main challenge with assume-guarantee reasoning techniques is to come up with
assumptions and guarantees that can be suitably used in the assume-guarantee rules. This
is typically a difficult manual process. Progress has been made on automating assume-
guarantee reasoning using learning and abstraction-refinement techniques for iterative
building of the necessary assumptions [19]. The original work was done in the context of
systems expressed as finite-state automata, but progress has been made in the automated
compositional verification for probabilistic and hybrid systems [14,2], which can be used
to model autonomous systems.
Assume-guarantee reasoning can be used for the verification of autonomous systems
either by replacing the component with its assume-guarantee specification in the com-
positional proofs or by using an assume-guarantee rule such as the above to decompose
the verification of the systems into the verification of its components. Furthermore, the
assume-guarantee specifications can be used to drive component-based testing and run-
time monitoring, in the cases where the design-time formal analysis is not possible, either
because the components are too large or they are adaptive, i.e. the component behavior
changes at run-time (using e.g. reinforcement learning).
3. Analysis for Deep Neural Network Components
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are computing systems inspired by the biological neural
networks that constitute animal brains. They consist of neurons (i.e. computational units)
organized in many layers. These systems are capable of learning various tasks from la-
beled examples without requiring task-specific programming. DNNs have achieved im-
pressive results in computer vision, autonomous transport, speech recognition, social
network filtering, bioinformatics and many other domains and there is increased inter-
est in using them in safety-critical applications that require strong assurance guarantees.
However, it is difficult to provide such guarantees since it is known that these networks
can be easily fooled by adversarial perturbations: minimal changes to correctly-classified
inputs, that cause the network to misclassify them. For instance, in image-recognition
networks it is possible to add a small amount of noise (undetectable by the human eye)
to an image and change how it is classified by the network.
This phenomenon represents a safety concern, but it is currently unclear how to
measure a network’s robustness against it. To date, researchers have mostly focused on
efficiently finding adversarial perturbations around select individual input points. The
goal is to find an input x′ as close as possible to a known input x such that x′ and x
are labeled differently. Finding the optimal solution for this problem is computation-
ally difficult, and so various approximation approaches have been proposed. Some ap-
proaches are gradient based [20,8,7], whereas other use optimization techniques [3].
These approaches have successfully demonstrated the weakness of many state-of-the-art
networks; however, these approaches operate on individual input points, and it is unclear
how to apply them to large input domains, unless one does a brute-force enumeration
of all input values which is infeasible for most practical purposes. Furthermore, because
they are inherently incomplete, these techniques can not even provide any guarantees
around the few selected individual points. Recent approaches tackle neural network ver-
ification [10,13] by casting it as an SMT solving problem. Still, these techniques operate
best when applied to individual points and further do not have a well-defined rationale to
select meaningful regions around inputs within which the network is expected to behave
consistently.
In [9], we developed a DNN analysis to automatically discover input regions that
are likely to be robust to adversarial perturbations, i.e. to have the same true label, akin
to finding likely invariants in program analysis. The technique takes inputs with known
true labels from the training set and it iteratively applies a clustering algorithm [12]
to obtain small groups of inputs that are close to each other (with respect to different
distance metrics) and share the same true label. Each cluster defines a region in the input
space (characterized by the centroid and radius of the cluster). Our hypothesis is that for
regions formed from dense clusters, the DNN is well-trained and we expect that all the
other inputs in the region (not just the training inputs) should have the same true label.
We formulate this as a safety check and we verify it using off-the-shelf solvers such
as Reluplex [13]. If a region is found to be safe, we provide guarantees w.r.t all points
within that region, not just for individual points as in previous techniques.
As the usual notion of safety might be too strong for many DNNs, we introduce
the concept of targeted safety, analogous to targeted adversarial perturbations [20,8,7].
The verification checks targeted safety which, given a specific incorrect label, guarantees
that no input in the region is mapped by the DNN to that label. Therefore, even if in
Figure 2. Inputs highlighted in light blue are mis-classified as Strong Right instead of COC.
Crossrange = ρ · sin(θ), Downrange = ρ · cos(θ).
that region the DNN is not completely robust against adversarial perturbations, we give
guarantees that it is safe against specific targeted attacks.
As an example, consider a DNN used for perception in an autonomous car that
classifies the images of a semaphore as red, green or yellow. We may want to guarantee
that the DNN will never classify the image of a green light as a red light and vice versa
but it may be tolerable to misclassify a green light as yellow, while still avoiding traffic
violations.
The safe regions discovered by our technique enable characterizing the input-output
behavior of the network over partitions of the input space, which can be encoded in the
assume-guarantee specifications for the DNN components. The regions will define the
conditions (assumptions), and the guarantees will be that all the points within the region
will be assigned the same labels. The regions could be characterized as geometric shapes
in Euclidean space with centroids and radii. The conditions would then be in terms of
standard distance metric constraints on the input attributes. For instance, all inputs within
a Euclidean distance r from the centroid cen of the region would be labeled l by the
network.
Note that the verification of even simple neural networks is an NP-complete prob-
lem and is very difficult in practice. Focusing on clusters means that verification can be
applied to small input domains, making it more feasible and rendering the approach as a
whole more scalable. Further, the verification of separate clusters can be done in parallel,
increasing scalability even further.
In [9] we applied the technique on the MNIST dataset [16] and on a neural net-
work implementation of a controller for the next-generation Airborne Collision Avoid-
ance System for unmanned aircraft (ACAS Xu) [11], where we used Reluplex for the
safety checks. For these networks, our approach identified multiple regions which were
completely safe as well as some which were only safe for specific labels. It also dis-
covered adversarial examples which were confirmed by domain experts. We discuss the
ACAS Xu experiments in more detail below.
3.1. ACAS Xu case study
ACAS X is a family of collision avoidance systems for aircraft which is currently un-
der development by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [11]. ACAS Xu is the
version for unmanned aircraft control. It is intended to be airborne and receive sensor
information regarding the drone (the
ownship) and any nearby intruder drones, and then issue horizontal turning advi-
sories aimed at preventing collisions. The input sensor data includes:
• ρ: distance from ownship to intruder;
• θ: angle of intruder relative to ownship heading direction;
• ψ: heading angle of intruder relative to ownship heading direction;
• vown: speed of ownship;
• vint: speed of intruder;
• τ : time until loss of vertical separation; and
• aprev: previous advisory.
The five possible output actions are as follows: Clear-of-Conflict (COC), Weak
Right, Weak Left, Strong Right, and Strong Left. Each advisory is assigned a score, with
the lowest score corresponding to the best action. The FAA is currently exploring an
implementation of ACAS Xu that uses an array of 45 deep neural networks. These net-
works were obtained by discretizing the two parameters, τ and aprev , and so each net-
work contains five input dimensions and treats τ and aprev as constants. Each network
has 6 hidden layers and a total of 300 hidden ReLU activation nodes. We were supplied a
set of cut-points, representing valid important values for each dimension, by the domain
experts [11]. We generated a set of 2662704 inputs (cartesian product of the values for
all the dimensions). The network was executed on these inputs and the output advisories
(labels) were verified. These were considered as the inputs with known labels for our
experiments.
We were able to prove safety for 177 regions in total (125 regions where the network
was completely safe against mis-classification to any label and 52 regions where the
network was safe against specific target labels). An example of the safety guarantee is as
follows;
∀ x ∈ |x− {0.19, 0.31, 0.28, 0.33, 0.33}|L1 ≤ 0.28 ⇒ label(x) = COC (1)
Here {0.19,0.31,0.28,0.33,0.33} are the normalized values for the 5 input attributes
(ρ,θ,ψ,vown,vint ) corresponding to the centroid of the region and 0.28 is the ra-
dius. The distance is in the Manhattan distance metric (L1). The contract states that
under the condition that an input lies within 0.28 distance from the input vector
{0.19,0.31,0.28,0.33,0.33}, the network is guaranteed to mark the action for it as COC
which is the desired output.
Our analysis also discovered adversarial examples of interest, which were validated
by the developers. Fig. 2 illustrates such an example for ACAS Xu.
The safety contracts obtained with the region analysis can be used in the compo-
sitional verification of the overall autonomous systems, which can be performed with
standard model checkers.
Figure 3. Example
4. Example
We illustrate our compositional approach on an example of an autonomous vehicle. The
platform includes learning components that allow it to detect other vehicles and drive
according to traffic regulations; the platform also includes reinforcement learning com-
ponents to evolve and refine its behavior in order to learn how to avoid obstacles in a new
environment.
We focus on a subsystem, namely an automatic emergency breaking system, illus-
trated in Figure 3. It has three components: the BreakingSystem, the Vehicle (which, to
simplify the presentation, we assume it includes both the autonomous vehicle and the en-
vironment) and a perception module implemented with a DNN; there may be other sen-
sors (radar, LIDAR, GPS) that we abstract away here for simplicity. The breaking system
sends signals to the vehicle to regulate the acceleration and breaking, based on vehicle
velocity, distance to obstacles and traffic signals. The velocity information is provided
as a feedback from the plant, the distance information is obtained from sensors, while
the information about traffic lights is obtained from the perception module. The percep-
tion module acts as a classifier over images captured with a camera. Such systems are
already employed today in semi-autonomous vehicles where adaptive cruise controllers
or lane keeping assist systems rely on image classifiers providing input to the software
controlling electrical and mechanical subsystems [6]. Suppose we want to check that the
system satisfies the following safety property: the vehicle will not enter an intersection if
the traffic light at the intersection turns red.
We write the system as the composition: BreakingSystem||Vehicle||NN. Each com-
ponent has an interface that specifies its input and output variables (ports), and their par-
allel composition is formed by connecting components via ports. We write the property
as follows (using Linear Temporal Logic, LTL, assuming discrete time): globally (G) if
the semaphore (input image x) is red then eventually (F), within 3 seconds, the velocity
becomes 0:
P :: G((x = red) ⇒ FT<3s(velocity = 0))
In practice, we would also need to encode in P the assumption that the distance to
traffic light is less than some threshold, but we simplify here to ease the presentation. We
are thus interested in checking that the system satisfies property P , written as S |= P .
We decompose the system into two subsystems: M1 = BreakingSystem||Vehicle and
M2 = NN and define two assume-guarantee contractsC1 andC2 for the two subsystems.
Suppose (part of) the contract for M1 is:
C1 :: G((Class = red) ⇒ FT<3s(velocity = 0))
The contract states that assuming the input (Class) to the subsystem M1 is red then
the vehicle is guaranteed to stop in at most 3 time units. We can further decompose
the verification of M1 into the separate verification of its components using additional
contracts and perform component-wise verification. It remains to formally characterize
the input-output behavior of the DNN in a contract that can be used in the compositional
proofs. This is a difficult problem because DNN are known to be vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations [20,15]: a small perturbation added to an image that shows a red semaphore
might lead the NN misclassifying it as having Class = green.
To address the problem, we use clustering over the training set (see Section 3) to
automatically find regions where the network is likely to be robust to adversarial per-
turbations. The result is a finite set R of well-defined regions, where a region ρ ∈ R
is characterized by a pair (c, r); c is the centroid and r is the radius of the region. We
then use a verification tool (such as Reluplex) to check that, for all inputs x within each
region, the NN classifies them to the same label as that of known inputs (and of c):
Cρ :: |x− c| < r ⇒ Label(x) = Label(c)
The training data available and the amount of noise could impact the validity of the
check. In such cases we may need to refine the contracts to include Bayesian estimates
of uncertainty [18]. Let Uncert(x) denote the uncertainty in the output of the NN for
an input x. We can then refine the contract to check that the label is as expected and the
uncertainty level is below a threshold. The DNN’s safety contract C2 could then be the
union of all the constraints of the form Cρ that are proved valid.
We are now ready to perform the compositional proof: if M1 |= C1 and M2 |= C2
and furthermore C1 ∧ C2 ⇒ P , it follows that M1||M2 |= P ; thus we prove that the
whole system satisfies the property, without composing its (large) state space. This proof
can be performed with standard model checkers.
4.1. Run-time Monitoring and Control
We note that the evidence we obtain from the analysis is conditional; we can only prove
that the property holds for the region contracts that we found to be safe. The information
encoded in the contract assumptions will need to be used to synthesize run-time guards
that monitor inputs that fall outside the conditions and instruct the system to take ap-
propriate, fail-safe actions. Note also that this compositional approach enables separate
verification of individual components: we can thus replace some of the verification tasks
for individual components with testing or simulation, which will increase scalability but
will give only empirical guarantees.
Furthermore, if the system contains adaptive components, the verification of those
components can be done at runtime, whereas the static components only need to be
checked once, at design time. Adaptive learning-enabled components pose additional
challenges over time. We can again use model uncertainty to identify situations in which
the adaptrive learning-enabled system is not confident about its decisions, and take ap-
propriate actions in such cases.
5. Conclusion
We presented a compositional approach for the verification of autonomous systems. The
approach uses assume-guarantee reasoning for scalable verification and can naturally in-
tegrate reasoning about the learning-enabled components in the system. We are working
on evaluating the proposed approach on various simulation and real autonomous plat-
forms, including self-driving cars (discussed briefly in Section 4), autonomous quad-
copters and airplanes. These case studies cover perception, decision making, control and
actuation of autonomous systems, and they include safety-critical cyber-physical com-
ponents as well as DNN components.
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